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Agonistic belonging:  
the banality of good, the “alt-right” and the need for sympathy  
 
Some years ago, taking a cue from the writing of Jean Améry,1 the great 
Fanonian survivor of the Auschwitz lagers, I began to argue that the black 
settlers, postcolonial peoples and refugees in Europe should try both to 
assume and to contest European identity. I wondered whether Europe’s 
national, regional and religious identities might be transformed by a strategic 
repositioning. Perhaps those habits could be altered for the better by the 
agonistic attachment of settler populations to the idea of Europe which would 
have to be reworked to include the inescapable fact of its creole future.  
Answering the sometimes violent racism that has blocked the liberating right 
to be seen to belong, those gestures of attachment would also involve seeking 
ways to bond subaltern, postcolonial and migrant histories with larger critical 
narratives of blacks and non-europeans located in a reconceptualised 
modernity that extended beyond Europe’s imperially-expanded geo-body.  
These provocations would not only encompass contributions to 
widespread struggles against racism and racial hierarchy. They would assist 
with the production of a counter-history of Europe that stretched back into the 
time before Europe became Europe out of the ashes of Christendom. Today, 
Europa’s Phoenician parentage has been forgotten but we should always 
remember that she was the daughter of Agenor, the king of Tyre.  
This hopeful strategy necessitated an adjustment in historical 
perspective. It demanded a comprehensive re-thinking of the brutal market-
activity in human beings that had made coffee, sugar, chocolate and tea, not to 
mention new forms of banking and insurance, familiar, even essential, 
elements in the common European habitus. It would be extremely difficult to 
implement, but it might be justified by the long term benefits of unambiguous 
admission into Europe’s official sense of itself. Acknowledging that their 
cultural plurality could not be reversed would alter European democracies. 
The associated critique of racism and racial orders would be a way to promote 
richer conceptions of citizenship and rights, resistant to even the most 
informal kinds of colour-coding and exclusion.  
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 Since 2001, the chance of that transformative intervention has been 
blocked and slowed by the effects of conducting counter-insurgency warfare 
on an unprecedented, planetary scale. Governments everywhere in Europe 
have buckled under pressure from the growth of ultra-nationalist and neo-
fascist movements with and without immediate electoral ambitions. What 
project Frontex and the Schengen agreement have done for Europe’s fortified 
physical space, resurgent racism and nationalism have accomplished for its 
emergent cultural space. New technology has increased the tempo of racist 
mobilization and fostered closer links between growing neo-fascist forces 
everywhere.2 
The forms of racism in which the idea of cultural and ethnic difference 
replaced earlier, simpler notions of biological hierarchy, have been enhanced 
by the idea that a clash of civilisations is currently underway. The global “war 
on terror” identified new enemies beyond the Manichaean architecture of the 
Cold War and promoted a decisive cultural turn. That momentum created a  
vicious circle. The global counterinsurgency displaced people who became 
refugees. They sought hospitality in unwelcoming locations where their very 
presence was judged not only to be alien but also to be invasive. Europe’s 
incomers and their locally-born descendants effectively became an “enemy 
within”. In response to these risks, security came gradually to dominate all 
other government functions. 
These dismal developments have contributed to the consolidation of 
the genre of political speech that Mahmood Mamdani described as “culture 
talk”.3 His term refers us not to the departed, Cold War world of conflicting 
ideologies, but to a shadowy land of nebulous values which can, in an instant, 
solidify into iconic ciphers of cultural difference that are considered 
unbridgeable and absolute. That ossified difference is imagined, just as it was 
during the nineteenth century, to be natural and geo-political. Of course, there 
are significant generational variations in the degree of attachment to the idea 
of race. That enthusiasm fluctuates with linguistic, regional and historical 
divisions as well as the reach of US technologies that have exported their 
racial habits to the rest of the world.  
A curiously backward-looking and comforting conception of culture is 
invoked to make this new xenology legitimate. The key to grasping its power is 
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the realisation that from the nostalgic angle of vision it promotes, cultural 
diversity is always a risk. Conceived in opposition to lofty civilization, lowly 
culture is mostly what minorities have. It blocks their assimilation but 
supplies them with a coveted ontological anchor that can keep them steady 
amidst the storms of austerity which now menace their innocent, if resentful, 
hosts.4 The accommodation of plurality with peaceful coexistence becomes 
unthinkable, as does the practical reconciliation of social solidarity with 
cultural diversity. Those key terms “plurality” and “diversity” are usually just 
polite code words for racialised variation.  
The resulting xenology has been configured by distinctive conceptions 
of political theology and political time. They aspire to the nation’s restoration 
and repossession and dictate that incomers constitute a security problem 
which we are obliged to recognise in strongly gendered forms. The male 
refugee becomes the “rape-fugee” who endangers white womanhood. The 
clothing worn by the covered women who accompany him is the disturbing 
avatar for the proteophobic anxieties of the indigenes.5 The re-written 
governmental conventions of the secure national state dictate that a stable 
polity can only ever comfortably accommodate psychopolitical mono-culture: 
invariant and immobile yet apparently, in testing contemporary conditions, 
endowed with solidarising, involutionary power.  
These assumptions specify an optimal relationship between frozen 
culture and fixed nationality that has other negative consequences. The way 
that people form and maintain the social groups to which they imagine they 
belong, is presented as the result of an essential disposition to associate 
positively only with those who are seen as already like themselves. This 
tendency towards sameness is likely to be grounded vogueishly in 
neuropsychology or genomics. Whatever its supposedly scientific foundations, 
it overwhelms all other social processes. In the context of contemporary 
European securitocracy, it combines readily with culturalist nationalism and 
xenophobia to create a toxic mixture. That blend has proved especially potent 
whenever politicians--from a variety of ideological directions--strive to recode 
the populist instincts to which the yearning for identity as sameness remains 
captive. Nationality, ethnicity and white victimage supply convenient 
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watchwords for all the clustering that is required in order to feel both safe and 
secure.  
Solidified and instrumentalised in this way, culture gets insulated from 
the stimulus of history, from everyday interaction and from social creativity. 
In that simplified form, it is amenable to being disciplined from above. 
National and racial groupings are thereby invited to possess their own 
exclusive culture: the inert object that is imagined to distinguish them from 
others. They are required to hold on to it as if it was a form of property. It may 
be dry and lifeless, but this antique and absolute thing can also be enthralling. 
Melancholically cast both as heritage and prospective nostalgia,6 it reduces 
citizens to a transient, intermediate presence in the longer story of the nation’s 
unique political ontology. Group character is maintained in simple, functional 
harmony with the ecologies of belonging that supposedly distinguish Europe’s 
authentic, rooted nationalities from each other, as well as from aliens, 
itinerants and interlopers. 
The dominance of this style of thought comprises a small but telling 
part of the de-politicising mechanism that inflates and amplifies 
contemporary culture-talk in the setting provided by officially–endorsed 
fantasies of civilizational antagonism. Its repetition conveys securitocracy’s 
version of geo-politics as a cultural conflict defined by the blending of race, 
ethnicity and religion into a single gestalt.  
 
The “alt-right” and the re-branding of Fascism 
The name “alt-right” was not coined by antifascists. It was chosen as a means 
to accomplish new political goals, by its enthusiasts and advocates: the 
proponents of the newest, combative varieties ultranationalism and racism.  
The term refers to a loose international alliance or informal coalition that is 
well-funded and enjoys access to the highest levels of power. The grouping is 
technologically sophisticated and has assembled an elusive command of 
political and psychological communication via the libidinal and affective 
aspects of new technology in general, and social media in particular.7  
This wholesale rebranding of a generic fascism was carefully 
constructed to maximize the effects of computer mediation. Operating 
effectively online since 2015, the “alt-right” and its various allies: the 
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identitarians, the alt-light, the neo-reactionaries and the old neo-Nazis, white 
supremacists and anti-semites, have projected a view of their activities no 
longer as radical evil, but as daring, transgressive, comic, ironic and futuristic. 
Even when supplemented by a contingent of disorientated imitators,8 these 
authoritarians have been able to summon up seductive images of the utopia 
that guides their pragmatic political choices. Their anti-racist opponents have 
yet to find an adequate answer.9 
Most commentators agree that the world this alliance seeks to build 
will be racially pure. It will rest squarely upon the revival of natural relations 
between men and women that have lately been distorted by feminism, and it 
will be dedicated to the preservation of the embattled west which is threatened 
in particular by demographic changes arising from the excessive fertility of 
non-white incomers. A residual echo of a much older racism insists that the 
West is menaced by the shadowy corporate forces of “international Jewry”.10 
The term Muslim has been secured ambiguously as a racial rather than a 
religious trope. The anti-Semitic foundations of contemporary racism are 
recycled in anxious commentary on the specific varieties of corruption 
introduced by Islam and the treacherous, “cultural Marxists” who use it as a 
Trojan horse.11 There is much more to say about each of the bloc’s constitutive 
elements and about the roles of race-thinking, xenology and culture-talk in 
their mutual articulation, but that detailed survey must await another 
occasion.  
Scholarly and political opinion is deeply divided about how to evaluate 
the threats they present. When discussing fascist ideas there is always a 
danger that critics end up taking them more seriously than their adherents do. 
Further difficulties arise because, so far, a lot of the critical analysis of this 
movement has been conducted online. Angela Nagle’s book Kill All Normies is 
a useful if limited primer.12 The theoretical and historical framing of that work 
is underdeveloped. The resulting limitations can be compensated for by 
drawing upon the valuable insights such as those supplied by the German 
philosopher, Byung-Chul Han, whose recent succession of short books has 
proved illuminating both as an ethico-political inquiry and as a provocative 
treatment of the contemporary media ecologies on which this movement has 
relied for amplification and legitimacy.13 
 
 
 
6 
Han’s work establishes that we have moved decisively beyond the 
firmly analog, mass-cultural world that defined the limits of propaganda in 
the era dominated by Freud’s notorious double nephew, Edward Bernays.14 He 
suggests that we are being delivered quietly into the clutches of algorithmic 
political culture and predictive analytics which have made human behavior 
predictable for the first time.15 That epochal change demands a more elaborate 
understanding of the relationship between information, communication and 
power than anything that Machiavelli, Foucault and their various successors 
have been able to provide.16 
The intellectual origins of the alt-right lie in a dizzyingly wide range of 
revolutionary-conservative and fascist thinkers. Its own advocates cite the 
influences of Oswald Spengler, Henry Mencken, Julius Evola, Ludwig Von 
Mises, Hans Hermann-Hoppe and the individualist libertarian Murray 
Rothbard. In the US context, the movement’s caste of organic intellectuals has 
acknowledged the influence of the “paleoconservatives” who revised the 
emphasis placed by neoconservatives on foreign policy. It is also claimed that 
the French New Right have supplied an important source of inspiration.17  
The movement draws heavily upon the commercial and technological 
clout of self-styled “neoreactionaries” who boast of extensive connections in 
Silicon Valley. Other contributors favour the accelerationist, neo-fascist and 
occult, semi-academic critics of bourgeois democracy and equality who have 
grown weary of indicting the hollow liberal pieties that maintain the official, 
institutional structures of power. This vocal substrate draws upon the dubious 
legacies of thinkers like Georges Bataille and Carl Schmitt as well as a techno-
orientalist sublime discovered in the exciting possibility that states will be 
shrunk down to minimal proportions and run as corporations with the aid of 
AI technology. This “neo-cameralist” dream is larded with a gleeful anti-
humanism and a fervent racism now routinely and blandly re-described as 
“human biodiversity” and “ethno-nationalism”. The would be Magi of the 
movement are led online by the failed academic philosopher Nick Land18 and 
others who have, in turn, been influenced by “Mencius Moldbug” a prominent 
techno-fogey who draws inspiration from some of the more obscure works 
penned by Victorian England’s theorists of imperial domination and has been 
lauded for it by President Trump.19 The poetics of H.P. Lovecraft are 
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combined with deep-ecological fantasies to form a loudly-trumpeted “dark 
enlightenment”. 
How all this is connected to Trump’s presidency also needs to be 
discussed in depth. His electoral campaign was a watershed because it gave a 
stamp of approval to the previously unspeakable nostrums of the racist, 
neofascist and ultra-nationalist right. As a result, a Trump-centred argument 
about the character of this movement may be both attractive and easy, but it is 
not very useful. It tends to reinstate a simpler, stabler moral and political 
environment that should be regarded with suspicion in the fluid 
communicative ecology we inhabit. 
The links between the old right and the emergent alt-right are still 
either inchoate or brittle. Some fellow travellers oppose Islam vociferously but 
are likely to shrink from the openly anti-semitic chanting, automatic weapons 
and flaming torches that were beamed around the world from the Summer 
2017 rally in Charlottesville, North Carolina. Not all the gamers, ironists and 
trolls who found a precious quantum of community on the 4-Chan board (all 
doubtless habituated to a “beta-male” existence in the basement of the 
parental home) want to be allied with the gun-toting belligerents and irony-
free rituals of the red-state militia-atti.  
New fodder for the movement is being provided by a youthful, 
proselytising cohort of influential Youtubers, bloggers and vloggers drawn 
from across the world. In Britain we find Paul Joseph Watson and the Scot 
Millennial Woes. They are allied with the Swede Henrik Palmgren, the 
Canadian Lauren Southern, Lana Lokteff and even the gamer, Pew-Die-Pie. 
These actors may, in future, be amenable to commercial pressures from the 
platforms they rely on to reach their numerous subscribers. They are likely to 
be tested further by divisions arising from the movement’s lack of unanimity 
with regard to gender relations. Similarly, the appeal of US’ fake news 
information warriors like Alex Jones may be limited by the parochialism of 
their discourse which, its love of metaphysical and generic whiteness aside, 
has translation problems in places where firearms are less popular as indices 
of political liberty and race war seems more remote than it does in the USA.  
The English journalist Carole Cadwalladr has shown how, as it feeds a 
political movement with an unprecedented transnational topography, the 
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technological infrastructure of this network raises a host of juridical and legal 
problems for sovereign national states. Though the machinery is still unevenly 
developed and deployed, have no doubt that the alt-right are ahead in gaming 
the Facebook and Google algorithms that place authoritative and emotionally-
charged propaganda repeatedly on the screens of the vulnerable minority that 
can affect the outcome of electoral processes by being open to changing its 
mind. Theresa Hong, a key practitioner responsible for scripting Trump’s 
Facebook posts during his electoral campaign, suggests that his tech advisors 
have written a new psychographical playbook for electoral campaigning which 
their political opponents have yet to even understand.20 In Europe, the 
damage being done to democratic political culture is far from only electoral. 
The centre of political gravity is being shifted to the right and what is 
considered respectable and responsible political conduct has been redefined. 
It is worth repeating that all of these forces intersect in and rely upon 
the political ontology of race. They oppose political correctness and 
multiculturalism and use the disputed issue of free speech relentlessly to alter 
the limits of what can be said publicly but those are secondary issues. This 
racial momentum will not be arrested by the tactics used in the past to fight 
back against its predecessors. The alt-right leadership style themselves as 
Gramscians and Leninists.21 They intend to play a long game. They have 
begun to make nests inside elite educational establishments such as my old 
place of employment, the London School of Economics.22  
The professional news media has been particularly inept at educating 
itself about the specific dangers posed by illiberal political forces that aim to 
grow their movement by lying and dissembling. The mainstream has not 
worked out how to handle these seductive, racist voices without amplifying 
them and increasing their reach. The attention economy that frames these 
public encounters, makes shocking and provocative statements much more 
valuable than quiet and sober reflection. In the epoch of “fake news”, the truth 
content of statements is therefore irrelevant most of the time. Other 
considerations are much more significant. 
The legacies of fascism now arrive in our lives from so many different 
directions simultaneously that the concept has lost much of the analytical, 
political and moral weight that it acquired in the later twentieth century. The 
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concept of racism has also fallen into disrepute as a result of overuse and 
trivialisation. Today’s would-be anti-racists generally prefer a vocabulary 
exported from the USA and centred on deliberately jarring terms like 
antiblackness and decoloniality. Routine activist chatter about black and 
brown bodies, the premium to be placed upon self-care, and the duty to 
develop intersectional approaches, suggests that the poetry of social 
transformation has been flattened out and the agenda of liberation curtailed 
by a disregard for language that is associated with unbridled enthusiasm for 
generic forms of identity. Communicative rationality is being squeezed so that 
it can fit the minimal space provided by soundbites and hashtags, tweets and 
memes, likes and follows. Political sentiment is hostage to narcissism and 
nihilism. 
An essentially docile, computer-mediated solidarity may be becoming 
the norm for activists, but new digital links arise with the transmission of 
spectacular horrors and the mainstreamed choreography of black resistance. 
Those network technologies often create nothing more than the mirage of a 
movement. On screen, racism, capitalism and militarism appear intractable, 
overwhelming. Off screen, large scale mobilisations can occur swiftly but are 
likely to evaporate just as fast. In the universe of time-line media, a click here 
and “like” there may secure the requisite hit of dopamine, but they leave an 
ailing world essentially untouched.23 Meanwhile, the structural inequalities 
that derive from institutional racism stagnate or appear to worsen. Giving 
voice to alternative and oppositional ways of living and thinking becomes 
progressively more difficult. Fatigue, frustration and anxiety take hold. The 
black radical tradition is routinely invoked, especially by its north American 
custodians, but it is usually a depthless inventory. History retreats to become 
a mere backstory, sparsely populated by sparkling, celebrity icons: a deified 
Audrey Lorde, a messianic James Baldwin. These problems are compounded 
by attempts to revive analyses and strategies that were produced to operate 
only in one remote set of circumstances and fail to retain any purchase in 
contemporary historical, political and cultural conditions. 
 
Refugees and the politics of human salvage  
The recent UNHCR annual report showed that our planet boasts 65 million 
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displaced people. Millions of refugees have arrived in Europe. Thousands 
more have died en route. In 2018, the data suggested that the number of 
fatalities occurring in transit had declined while the proportion of travellers at 
risk of death was rising sharply. 
 
 A higher proportion of people are dying at sea, with one death for every 
18 persons who arrived in Europe via the central Mediterranean route 
between January and July this year (2018) compared to one death for 
every 42 in the same period in 2017.24 
 
This history of maritime flight foregrounds the varying value assigned to 
supposedly different varieties of human life. It can therefore be made to 
resonate with the earlier forced movement of Africans into the reified 
condition of enslaved negroes: the human fuel that catalyzed the modern 
economic magic of European capitalism. At the contemporary end of the same 
historical arc, we find Africans, Afghanis, Iraqis, Syrians and others fleeing 
war and climate change. They are now likely to be represented as waste 
people--human waste—that inhabits an attentuated middle passage: 
contained, encamped and lodged in spaces of exception that may be inside but 
are more often found beyond the reach of national states. Those zones are 
inhabited by displaced people considered as denizens rather than citizens. 
Their inhabitants are hostage to the contingencies of loosely-regulated local 
authorities and NGOs that, despite their name, are an integral part of the 
neoliberal governmental apparatus: charitable, outsourced and sub-
subcontracted.  
If these fugitives reach Europe, the patterns of segregation and conflict 
that await them do not straightforwardly reproduce the US patterns that were 
rooted in the nomos of continental slavery. In London, the horrors of Grenfell 
Tower revealed that a different segregation can operate more by wealth than 
by racial hierarchy alone. The radical geographer, Danny Dorling has for 
example shown that Britain’s spatial division is often more vertical than it is 
horizontal. Updated conceptions of class antagonism and racialised inequality 
are urgently required if we are to comprehend these variations. 
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Cut Britain up horizontally rather than by neighbourhood, and you do 
find minority-majority areas. For example above the fifth floor of all 
housing in England and Wales a minority of children are white. Most 
children growing up in the tower blocks of London and Birmingham - 
the majority of children 'living in the sky' in Britain - are black.25  
 
Humanity compassion and life in common 
In many parts of Europe, political opinion has expressed compassion for the 
plight of incoming refugees and asylum seekers. Those responses are fragile 
but it is important to appreciate that there have been many generous and 
humane responses to what is often only remote suffering. Those humane 
gestures coexist in complex ways with patterns of nationalist, racist and 
xenophobic hatred as well as resentments, anxieties and fears rooted in the 
idea that displaced people represent contagion and the contamination or 
corruption of previously pure and peaceful places.  
The discrepancy between antipathy and sympathy is now 
conventionally measured on the imagined bodies of women. The relative and 
relational analysis of women’s subordination and the integrity of feminist 
responses to the sex/gender arrangements of incomers have become 
significant questions. We cannot assume that we will agree about how they 
should be understood. Since the 2016 New Year’s Eve events in Cologne, the 
image of Asian and African men motivated by their desire to enact gross forms 
of violence on local white women, has become yet again a focal point for 
popular loathing of racialised foreigners in general and Muslims in particular. 
Their cultures, so we are told, are uniquely repressed, violent and sexually 
incontinent. How these stories are presented in the media, and the history of 
this intersectional menace in the activities of white-supremacist organisations 
are both germane to their contemporary power in the context of obsessive, 
absolutist talk about cultural difference. 
In spite of the relentless charge of the racist and ultra nationalist right, 
there are significant residues of ordinary decency. Everywhere we look, 
alongside the fear and resentment that punctuate the space between terrorist 
attacks, we discover extensive local organizing and dynamic solidarity enacted 
in the names of hospitality and common humanity as well as a strong desire, 
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evident in many places, to work around expanding police power and the 
strictures of ruthless, high-tech securitocracy. There have been moves afoot 
for civil society organisations to pressurize but also to bypass government 
power, opposing racism and xenophobia in order to build a culture of 
hospitality and supportive, independent, vernacular connections with 
fugitives, incomers and settlers via the work of dedicated non-governmental 
bodies like Refugee Support as well as less formal and more fluid local 
coalitions and activist bodies. In the context provided by the steady ebbing of 
religious morality and the drift towards what the Norwegian mass murderer, 
Anders Brevik called “cultural Christianity”. These ethical gestures are an 
important part of the making of a post-secular morality centred on empathy, 
mutuality and generous openness to alterity. Nobody knows how long this 
interlude will last. 
In 2017, I stood in my own neighbourhood in the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack watching a spontaneous groundswell of mutuality, reciprocity 
and togetherness while listening to those feelings of empathy being dismissed 
contemptuously as “white guilt” by a few young activists based elsewhere who 
happened to be standing close by. They had come to express their solidarity 
but they did not know our area and its history. However, they felt sufficiently 
confident—they would probably say “empowered”--to sneer and pour scorn on 
the public outpouring of sympathy that transgressed every threshold of 
identity politics. Those paranoid responses masquerade today as sophisticated 
varieties of radicalism.   
Of course—as we’ve seen in France—the nature of Europe’s ongoing 
political emergency means that many people abandon the trials of sympathy 
and prefer to renounce their hard-won liberties in pursuit of enhanced 
security. It is not clear at this point whether the networks aimed at support for 
refugees and undocumented incomers will be sufficient to withstand the 
mechanisms of criminalization that have begun to be directed against them.  
These contradictory responses appear in polities deeply divided by 
urgent pleas for the accommodation of cultural difference and what we might 
loosely call anti-racist demands for human recognition and the presumption 
of equal dignity. The variety of recognition being sought in emergency 
conditions, close to spaces of death like Grenfell Tower or in the waters off the 
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Libyan coast, is not of a familiar philosophical variety. Charles Taylor and the 
others who have adapted the old approaches of Kant and Hegel have often 
presented recognition through a primary concern with the maintenance of 
dignified individual particularity— in Taylor’s terms, “authenticity”.26 That 
problem is considered only in the setting provided by liberal democracy and is 
often either over-identified with impossible demands for tolerance or, in the 
difficult translation into discussions of group rights, misconstrued as an 
infinite, recursive relativism.  
The desire to be recognized as a human being, against the strictures of 
ethnic absolutism and racism, does not boil down to political conversation 
that can be defined by its fluent command of group identity specified 
according to the habits previously based upon acknowledgement of individual 
selfhood under eighteenth-century Europe’s rules. This desire for the illusive 
state of “equal dignity” operates as part of a plea for recognition not as 
culturally specific but as vitally and corporeally human. That demand becomes 
different because it is articulated explicitly against the forbidding 
specifications and structural effects of racial hierarchy. The resulting pleas are 
by no means always directed, nomophilically towards the attainment of rights. 
They appear routinely in circumstances where the acknowledgement of 
humanity has either been withheld or is explicitly denied, where the passage 
towards inclusion in species life, has been closed off by the invocation of 
“Man” in race-friendly, anthropological hierarchies. The bans or other 
exclusionary mechanisms evident in those arrangements refer us immediately 
and violently to the contested limits of political communities that have been 
built or stratified according to the incorrigible facticity of race. Whether race is 
figured as natural history, as culture or as political anatomy, institutionalized 
racism imagines and assembles it as an absolute, division in social and 
political life. Human and infrahuman can, it seems, always be distinguished if 
not by nature then by the equally formidable signatures of culture and 
ethnicity. 
These are considered vulgar and even disruptive points to raise in 
polite, scholarly company. Analysis of racism is almost always ruled out of 
serious discussion either because its history remains deeply discomforting and 
has therefore been firmly repressed, or because, where its legitimacy is 
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conceded, it can only be appreciated retrospectively and gets relegated to the 
past.  
From that perspective, racism is considered to be over and done with. It 
tells Europe what it was and is no longer. If racism is discovered still to be 
active, its residual significance is accepted only within a narrow band of 
postcolonial locations, not least of which is the political and economic archive 
of Europe’s modern expansion across the Atlantic.  
I want to suggest, against that popular viewpoint, that racism remains a 
more significant, even a constitutive aspect, of European history. It has 
travelled, mutated and grown from its enlightenment roots in the same 
intellectual soil that yielded the idea of essential human equality but which, 
we should always remember, provided no significant obstacles to the 
exterministic consolidation of European colonies and empires. The undoing of 
those governmental and economic systems was a largely unacknowledged 
element in the creation of the EU as a political and commercial unit.27  
The intertwined histories of race and empire, colonies and 
decolonisation can still furnish us with valuable analytic tools with which to 
come to terms with modern Europe’s democratic promise as well as its 
limitations and pathologies. We can employ some of those resources to begin 
to explain how today’s dismissal of vulnerable people as vermin by the 
influential commentators who have urged military responses to their 
encroachment on European sovereign territory, has become part of a powerful, 
popular politics in so many different national states.  
The desperate, unwanted incomers who have been targeted for that 
violent treatment can sometimes be grudgingly admitted into the most 
abstract grouping of humankind. They are assigned to lower orders of 
existence where the problems presented by their alien attributes can be 
managed anthropologically as expressions of racial, ethnic and cultural 
difference that belong elsewhere. I am over simplifying here. We should 
acknowledge significant regional and cultural variations in the intensity of 
attachment to race, to the norm of whiteness and to religious or ethical habits 
that might qualify them. The degree of humanity identified in or awarded to 
Europe’s others fluctuates and consequently determines the quality of 
sympathy and/or empathy that will be expressed once the veil of alterity has 
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been torn to reveal, unexpectedly, a needy, vulnerable human countenance 
beneath. That epiphany has become a more complex event because the scale 
upon which humanity can be imagined and encountered has been changed by 
the expansion of digital infrastructure. Those shocking discovery of the 
Other’s humanity has usually been conveyed through visual engagement that 
reorganizes distance and modifies the degree of intimacy involved in 
becoming present to each other. And yet, against what Fanon identified as the 
intensity of epidermalisation and its racial corporeal schema, something like a 
“real dialectic between the body and the world” can begin, unanticipated, to 
reassert itself in the politics of sympathy.28  
Once the epidermalised body has been perceived as the primary object 
of racial hierarchy, the significance of consciousness is overtaken by violent, 
corrective attention to the shifting significance of corporeality. At that point, 
ontology itself becomes an historical and social phenomenon and thus, despite 
its eternal, fixed appearance, the unstable equilibrium of the racial corporeal 
schema can be overthrown. It will be upset and even undone if our 
reassertions of the “real dialectic between the body and the world” are 
sufficiently tenacious. 
 
Antiracism today 
In Britain, diversity management imported from the corporate world has 
supplied government with an attractive yardstick for measuring the 
modernization of key institutions. This is especially important now that 
nobody—not even the most committed and ideological of white 
supremacists—wants to admit to being a racist. The Finsbury Park terror 
attacker, the murderer of Jo Cox MP, even Tommy Robinson, the erstwhile 
leader of the EDL and UK Pegida, have all denied that they are, personally 
racist. This is the flimsy substance of the “alt” in the “alt-right”. 
The fact that the number of unabashed and enthusiastic racists seems 
to have declined, is one of the biggest changes to have occurred during the last 
few decades. The near disappearance of these pariahs needs to be accounted 
for historically and in a detailed way—a detour that I cannot accomplish here. 
It relates to the history of antiracist sentiment in popular culture, to a 
transition between political generations, to the after-effects of Rock Against 
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Racism, punk and rave culture as well as to the conviviality that both derived 
from and remade Britain’s class dynamics as well as its gender relations.  
To cut a long and complex story short, that precious outcome was what 
we used to call “multiculturalism” until use of that rather helpful concept was 
shut out from serious scholarship and demonstrably “grown up” political 
conversation. Proposing its rehabilitation here, requires me to make clear that 
I refer not to narrow, ideological or professional specifications of cultural 
plurality, but to the lived, sensuous practice of people disposed, generously 
and honestly to try and manage the conflicts that inevitably arise between 
them by making better communication, better translation and richer forms of 
mutuality, especially those based upon affinity, gender, neighbourhood, 
sexuality, age, common passions and shared interests rather than on violence, 
imagined unanimity and the comforting prescriptions ethnic absolutism.  
The lack of proud, unabashed racists creates other problems which 
come into focus when we consider the difficulties involved in identifying and 
categorising racist and fascist discourse, rhetoric and argumentation. We 
learned painfully from the voluminous writings of the mass murderer, Anders 
Brevik, that it was possible to be an anti-Semite who enthused over the state 
of Israel. Today, neofascist movements all promote their black and brown 
membership as the proof that they have embarked upon a new, post-racial 
chapter. Tommy Robinson leads these developments with his sincere-
sounding declarations that he is offended by homophobia and anti-Semitism. 
He warrants his opposition to Islam with a question we hear all too frequently 
these days resounding across the swampy, no man’s land of fading 
distinctions between Left and Right. “How’s it racist to oppose a fascist 
ideology?” he inquires innocently, winking at the swelling legions of homo-
nationalists, the liberal mainstream and a sizeable contingent of feminists 
against fundamentalism. Readers of his autobiographical book Enemy of The 
State have had to interpret his exaggerated, but in many ways convincing, 
versions of the time-worn “some of my best mates are black” line of 
justification.29  
The politics of race is evolving and we must adapt our understanding to 
take its transformation into account. It corresponds in many ways to the 
resurgent discourse of individual uplift that has won wide appeal in a 
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neoliberal environment where the inability to succeed in life gets regularly 
explained as a personal failing rather than a structural matter. In a supposedly 
“postracial” society, being unable to achieve wealth, status and security is 
frequently imagined to result from individual failure to develop the correct 
aspirations, resilience, standards and values.  
The general intensification of inequality that has been lately evident 
can thus be re-interpreted. As its deeper causes remain inaccessible, 
inequality’s cultural manifestations provide straightforward targets for 
political intervention. Operating only on an interpersonal scale, rising 
inequality can be discounted as a result either of personal prejudice by 
gatekeepers or of personal failure by applicants for admission to the escalator 
upwards into the corporate redoubt.   
 
Antiracism and the politics of sympathy 
Several years ago the notorious photograph of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi’s 
corpse on the sand at the water’s edge was a landmark event in a larger 
spectacle of war, flight, desperation and suffering. The politics of attention is 
relevant again here because this history includes the growing agency of 
governments in the ever-closer management of what can and cannot be seen 
by their citizens. In several settings, the same contested visibility has become 
politically significant. The orchestration of emotions and the scripting of affect 
are now intrinsic to the moulding of popular opinion in decaying public 
spheres haunted by trolls and the spectre of fake news. Whether tight control 
over the politics of the image and the spectacle can be sustained in the age of 
camera-phones fuelled by African minerals, is in our hands, or rather in our 
pockets. 
What seems more important than those epochal changes is the fact that 
among radicals and what is left of the Left, the ideas of empathy and sympathy 
have been allowed to sink into disrepute. This trend seems to be particularly 
evident among academics—whose moral and political perspectives in the era 
after critique, tend to reject what Hannah Arendt described as the politics of 
pity and have been tempered instead by the effects of the anti-humanist 
training bequeathed to them by the second half of the twentieth century.  
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One of Britain’s most celebrated feminist scholars seemed to speak for 
a disoriented generation when her busy twitter feed dismissed sympathy 
altogether as an “imperialist notion”. On the other hand, in a televised 
Christmas message to the British people, Abdullah Kurdi the grieving father of 
the children whose bodies had so eventfully been washed ashore on Turkey’s 
Aegean coast, pleaded for “just a little bit of sympathy from you”.  That 
request asked his audience to consider whether it is possible to develop 
solidarity without sympathy or to build an antiracist movement without any 
prospect of empathic repair?30 In the meantime, we need to know how 
hostility to sympathy come to be so widespread among avowed radicals that it 
could function as a measure of interpretative sophistication and ethical 
probity? Even if compassion serves the psychic needs of the remote observer 
of horrors that result from decisions taken by our unrestrainable governments, 
are its practical results necessarily tainted when they touch the victims and 
offer them shelter, sustenance and warmth? 
This discussion has a long history that became inextricably entangled 
with the racial divisions that resulted from colonial and imperial statecraft as 
well as the politics of print and oppositional publishing during the nineteenth 
century movements to abolish slavery and protect indigenous peoples from 
genocide.31 But there is more at stake than the just scale upon which moral 
and political judgements are to be made. Near or far, close or distant. The 
geometry of suffering is not a Euclidean phenomenon.  
Before and after the colonial period, struggles against racism and racial 
hierarchy have contributed directly and consistently to contested conceptions 
of the human. They valorised forms of humanity that were not amenable to 
colour-coding and complicated the understanding of human sameness and 
species being, of life in common.   
So, against the argument conventionally made by those who argue that 
racial tolerance and human fellow feeling are insubstantial things in the face 
of underlying and untamable natural differences that favour evolutionary 
mechanisms like the uneven distribution of trust between members of various 
racial groups or hostile responses to the phenotype of the other, I want to 
identify the battle against racism in ethics, epistemology and political ontology 
as of fundamental concern.  
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That battle involves more than the recalibration of the concept of 
recognition and its supplementation by the idea of relationality. It has a 
bearing upon the prospect of encountering humanity outside of or beyond its 
racial figurations, though not in its post-human forms. The Jamaican Sylvia 
Wynter is one of several postcolonial thinkers who, working with a palette of 
Fanonian concepts, have spoken of the need for a re-engagement with the 
human after the death of man. We are not yet postracial, but we need ideas of 
what a world shorn of racial hierarchy and inequality will be like if we are to 
sustain our movement and not become disoriented in the face of the challenge 
posed by the “alt-right”. 
Struggles against racism have sometimes been utopian in character yet 
they have shaped a distinctive philosophical perspective. It is rooted in the 
fragile universals and radical interdependency that first came into focus on 
the insurgent edges of colonial contact zones where the brutality of racialized 
statecraft was repudiated and cosmopolitan varieties of care and conviviality 
unexpectedly took shape across the boundaries of culture, civilization, 
language and technology.  
This type of response should be sharply differentiated from the 
armoured humanitarianism that currently dominates our geopolitical 
environment. It can be traced into the nineteenth century where, alongside 
the resistance offered against colonial power by indigenous peoples, we 
encounter critics of the colonial enterprise who operated from inside the 
colonisers’ own national states. There were dissenters, protesters and other 
advocates for the humanity and the liberty of colonized peoples. Sometimes 
they articulated what we can still recognize today as an antiracist politics. 
Their opposition to the racial order of empires was often, though by no means 
exclusively, a religious reaction which recognized imperialism and colonialism 
to be fundamentally belligerent and therefore opened into a broader advocacy 
for the cause of peace. At other times, there was a close association with 
Feminist politics premised upon the interconnection of all systems of 
oppression and on the potential unity of all oppressed and exploited peoples.  
If we wish to understand the dead spots in the rickety structure of the 
liberal humanitarian tradition, and if we wish to make sense of the recurrence 
of its old weaknesses which have been apparent to critics for a very long time, 
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if we want to restore socialism and feminism or to salvage the Left, there is no 
choice now but to turn our attention towards the problems of racism, 
raciology and racial hierarchy. This is to be done not because it exhausts the 
inventory of humankind’s moral failure, but because that necessary 
confrontation can provide important critical resources from which a richer 
grasp of humanity might be assembled and a new reparative project conceived. 
We must be able critically to analyze the practical institutionalization of 
race hierarchy in governmental power and prepared to understand its 
complex articulation both to nationalist thought and to the political and 
juridical architecture of national states.  
The slaves from many different places who were exchanged for guns, 
rum, cloth, salt cod and other commodities and currencies recoiled from their 
own brutal reification. They became, as Fanon put it, objects among other 
objects, human commodities circulating among other commodities in a new, 
oceanic economy governed by unprecedented legal and procedural 
instruments. We should know by now that their various descendants inside 
and outside the fortifications of overdevelopment have inherited elements of 
the slaves’ irreducibly modern predicament, not least of which was their 
vulnerability.  
Not long ago, a British prime minister referred to the Mediterranean 
refugees huddled in what we’d been told to call their “Jungle” settlement at 
Calais, as “a swarm”. This was a further sign of the salience of the struggle 
over the human I have been trying to identify. David Cameron glossed his 
rhetorical choice by saying:   
 
“I was not intending to dehumanise, I don't think it does dehumanise 
people. Look at what Britain's response has been. We have made sure 
that we sent the Royal Navy flagship to the Mediterranean which has 
rescued thousands of people, saved thousands of lives. Britain's aid 
budget is helping to stabilise the countries from which these (migrants) 
have come.”32 
 
Cameron’s dog-whistled projection was inflected by earlier racist discourses 
that had been aimed at incoming, post-1945 black settlers and, in the late 
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nineteenth-century, at fugitive Jews. However, the hyperbolic presentation of 
those drowning refugees as an elemental, existential threat to our way of life 
was so peculiar, so neurotic and so duplicitous that it demanded 
uncomfortable answers to the question of what the civilization Cameron and 
company had vowed to defend might actually entail. That civilization is not, in 
fact, a European or Christian phenomenon but a narrowly national affair. It 
coincides only with the archipelagic body of the United Kingdom.  
The rampart of the sea has done its historic work. The “Wogs” do, after 
all, begin at Calais, and as the vote against membership demonstrated, the 
misguided efforts of the EU are themselves constructed as an alien, de-
civilising influence, levering boatloads of menacing jihadis into no-longer-
Great Britain’s formerly quiet and peaceful islands. This nationalist myopia is 
bound to conflict with the planetary risks of biomedical catastrophe and the 
menace of climate-change which, as the seas rise, can be expected entirely to 
redraw the familiar parameters of economic life and political interests.  
I hope that as we encounter those conditions a resurgent antiracism 
will help to generate a cautious, post-humanist humanism capable of grasping 
multispecies relationships between human and nonhuman. If successful, this 
will be distinguishable from other, previous varieties of humanism by being 
made, as Aimé Césaire put it while contemplating the wreckage and waste of 
world war two, “to the measure of the world”.33  That fragile alternative is 
today as precious as it is elusive. My hope is that it can excavated from the 
unique conceptual space in which combative antiracist humanism has 
repeatedly confronted colonialism, racism and nationalism.  
That contested location can be triangulated in various ways. Efforts to 
map it must include the cruel rhetoric of the various Fascists who denounced 
their victims as vermin in order to make them easier to exterminate. From 
there, it is only a short hop towards the idiotic white supremacy calculatedly 
voiced by populist political leaders in the form of racist common-sense: as 
hateful as it is gleeful.  
So, in the spirit of humanism’s re-enchantment, let us seek a different 
perspective on the trials of European culture than the angles of vision offered 
to us by Farage, Wilders, Le Pen, Petry, Hopkins, Halla-aho, Orban, Åkesson, 
and their ilk. In other words, let us try to see whether that civilization has been 
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able to sustain and maintain itself or whether we are now condemned only to 
a choice between different varieties of barbarism. Opportunities for an 
experiment in the banality of good are all around us.  
In conclusion, I will explore one of them briefly. I have spent the last 
couple of years collecting and comparing contemporary tales of drowning and 
shipwreck. I want to turn not to the many moving stories of heroic action at 
sea that might serve briefly to affirm the epiphany of a new humanism born 
from the challenges of maritime rescue and salvage, but to a related, much 
sadder case of Pateh Sabally, a twenty-one year old refugee from Gambia who 
committed suicide by drowning himself in Venice’s Grand Canal in January 
2017. That very public death was investigated by magistrates after a videotape 
of it was placed online. It was notable because it had been watched and 
recorded by a sizable crowd composed of locals and tourists from outside 
Italy. Some of that crowd were said to have been jeering at him as he drowned 
and making derogatory, anti-immigrant comments. One spectator was, for 
example heard shouting the word “Africa”. 
Sabally was not the survivor of a wrecked ship. He had ended up at the 
Italian port of Pozzallo two years earlier after the overloaded boat that had 
carried him from Africa was intercepted by the authorities. The security 
cameras at Venice’s Santa Lucia station yielded a recording of him sitting on 
the steps overlooking the Grand Canal ten minutes before he was spotted 
floundering in the water.  
He appears to have jumped in voluntarily, probably as a response to the 
failure of his petition to the Italian government to be allowed to claim asylum 
and remain in the country. The local media said Sabally had previously been 
given a temporary permit [Permesso di Soggiorno] to stay in Italy but had 
travelled into Switzerland seeking work so that he could move closer to family 
in Mexico. He had then been returned to Italy by officials.  
He was thrown several life preservers by the crew of a vaporetto which 
approached him but does not seem to have made any attempt to use those 
devices to save himself. Apparently the crew of those craft are expressly 
forbidden to leave them even to engage in a rescue. La Nuova di Venezia e 
Mestre reported that after viewing various videos of the event, the authorities 
would bring charges against a 35-year-old driver of a motoscafo belonging to 
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the Casinò di Venezia, who had passed close to the drowning man but had not 
stopped to offer him any assistance. That failure to provide aid apparently 
violated the city’s codes of navigation. The facts of the case remain obscure 
even if we can be sure that the Grand Canal is not exactly the high seas.  
Dino Basso, a local official in the Italian association of lifeguards, said: 
“I don’t want to blame anyone, but maybe something more could have been 
done to save him.”34 While Venice’s mayor, Luigi Brugnaro admonished 
anybody seeking to politicize the case and announced that funeral costs would 
be met from the city’s municipal fund and the body sent back to Africa.  
Perhaps the basic philosophical kernel to be extracted from this tragedy 
which unfolded against a backdrop of riots in Italy’s detention and holding 
centres, is not the old Levinasian lesson about how a primal relation with and 
responsibility for alterity precedes ontology, but rather that those reactions 
instiutionalised in the law of the sea have ceased to operate, especially where 
the encounter with a drowning fellow human is mediated by a phone camera 
that occupies the hands of the potential rescuer and turns the drowning to 
which they refuse to bear witness, into an internet spectacle.  
This example can be made part of a wider struggle to re-enchant 
humanism by endowing a stronger sense of reciprocal humanity in Europe’s 
proliferating encounters with vulnerable otherness. There is more to be 
salvaged from the water than wreckage and corpses. Europe’s relationship 
with its own shrinking civilization is at stake in the decision to intervene as 
well as in the later lives of the survivors. 
Similar lessons about the rhetoric of humanity and the need for new 
humanisms can doubtless be learned from other instances in which the issues 
of humanity and alterity have been refigured in emergency or disaster 
conditions by bold, generous acts of solidarity. They might also be considered 
to have a philosophical significance discernable outside of nationality, 
ethnicity, faith or racial hierarchy. It appears that the re-enchantment of the 
human, implicitly proposed here in abstract terms, is already underway. 
These examples can provide a opportunity to enrich our understanding 
of the changes that characterize the postcolonial world. But there is even more 
than that at stake. Stories like these help us to find out which differences will 
be different enough to matter in a neoliberal era that is emphatically “diverse” 
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and indulges its voracious appetite for exotica in inverse proportion to the 
ebbing of democracy and its vexed histories of hospitality and cosmopolitan 
hope.  
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